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UNITED STATES V. BENCHECK: AGGREGATE PENALTIES
AND JURY ENTITLEMENT IN MULTIPLE PETTY
OFFENSE CASES
I. INTRODUCTION
For over a century, the United States Supreme Court has inter-
preted the constitutional right to jury trial' to extend only to the prose-
cution of serious criminal offenses. 2 The task of distinguishing serious
from petty offenses has, through the years, proven formidable. Today
the Court considers maximum statutory penalties the most accurate in-
dex of criminal seriousness.3 In single offense cases, crimes authorizing
incarceration exceeding six months are deemed serious, while those au-
thorizing incarceration of six months or less are presumed petty.
4
In United States v. Bencheck,5 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
faced an issue not yet addressed by the Supreme Court: jury entitle-
ment in the prosecution of multiple petty offenses. In Bencheck, the de-
fendant was tried without a jury on four petty offense charges arising
from one incident. The charges carried an-aggregate statutory incarcer-
ation period greater than eighteen months.6 Consecutive sentencing
was legislatively authorized, and consolidation of offenses was not re-
quired.7 However, due to a pretrial sentencing stipulation, the defend-
ant actually faced a maximum incarceration of only six months.8 In
assessing the seriousness of the defendant's criminality to determine
jury entitlement, the court declined to consider the aggregate statutory
penalty and instead based its assessment upon the judicially reduced
penalty the defendant actually faced. 9
This Comment will trace the history of the petty offense exception
to the constitutional right to jury trial through English common law,
United States Supreme Court interpretations, and, finally, Tenth Circuit
opinions. It will then explore and analyze the reasoning of the majority
and the dissenting opinions in Bencheck. Finally, this Comment will ar-
gue that the majority based its jury entitlement determination upon a
1. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. Const. amend VI.
2. Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 552, 555, 557 (1888). Callan was the first Supreme
Court case to make this interpretation. See infra note 20 and accompanying text, and text
accompanying notes 21-22.
3. See Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541 (1989). The statutory
or "authorized" penalty includes the authorized period of incarceration as well as other
statutory punishment. Id. at 543 & n.8.
4. Id. at 543; see infra text accompanying note 55. Because the case central to this
Comment is primarily concerned with incarceration periods and does not involve fines,
this Comment does not discuss statutory fines.
5. 926 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1991).
6. Appellant's Reply Brief at 4 n.1, United States v. Bencheck, 926 F.2d 1512 (10th
Cir. 1991) (No. 90-6072).
7. See infra note 118.
8. Bencheck, 926 F.2d at 1514.
9. Id. at 1520.
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method of ascertaining criminal seriousness that facially contradicted
the Supreme Court's traditional method and that was constitutionally
inappropriate because it abandoned substantive interests that the tradi-
tional method had evolved to serve.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The History of the Petty Offense Exception
In England, in the early fourteenth century, juries decided all crimi-
nal cases.1 0 This practice became infeasible as Parliament's prolific en-
actment of penal statutes overburdened the system with prosecutions. " I
In 1362, to accommodate the increasing volume ofjury trials, England's
traveling justices began holding sessions at quarterly intervals,' 2 but in
time even the quarter session courts became overburdened with jury tri-
als.' 3 Thus, in the sixteenth century, statutes creating minor, or
"petty," offenses authorized prosecutions without juries. 14 To further
ease the burden, justices began hearing the new class of summarily tria-
ble cases out of sessions whenever necessary. 15 Penal statutes contin-
ued to multiply, and by the eighteenth century summarily triable
offenses greatly dominated England's criminal code.16 The English col-
onists brought summary proceedings to America, eventually adopting
the practice in state constitutions. 17 Yet, in America the class of offenses
excluded from the jury process was considerably smaller than that found
in England at the time.' 8 At the writing of the United States Constitu-
tion, summary proceedings for petty offenses were well-entrenched.' 9
That the framers tacitly excluded petty offenses from the ambit of the
jury clauses in Article III and the Sixth Amendment is a widely held
belief.
20
10. Felix Frankfurter & Thomas G. Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional
Guaranty of Trial byJury, 39 HARV. L. REv. 917, 923-24 (1926); see also GEOFFREY R.Y. RAD-
CLIFFE & GEOFFREY CROSS, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM, 67 (Lord Cross of Chelsea & GJ.
Hand eds., 5th ed. 1971) (Cases were decided by juries by the 1300's.). "Presenting ju-
ries," precursors to modern grand juries, were established about a century and a half ear-
lier. See 1 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERICK W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAw 151 (2d ed. reissued 1968).
11. See Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 10, at 924-27.
12. See RADCLIFFE & CROSS, supra note 10, at 73.
13. Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 10, at 925.
14. Id. at 924-27.
15. Id. at 925. These latter tribunals became known as "petty sessions." RADCLIFFE &
CROSS, supra note 10, at 76, 204.
16. See 10 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 159-60 (1938);
Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra, note 10 at 930-33. Today, the vast majority of English
criminal cases are still tried without a jury. See MARCUS GLEISSER, JURIES AND JUSTICE 46
(1968); LLOYD E. MOORE, THE JURY, TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY 127 (1973);
GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE PROOF OF GUILT 302 (3d ed. 1963).
17. Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 10, at 937.
18. Id. at 936. In fact, the colonists perceived the Crown's extensive use of summary
proceedings as oppressive. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 15 (U.S. 1776);
SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 267-70 (Richard L. Perry ed. 1959).
19. Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 10, at 962-69.
20. Id. at 937-69; see, e.g., Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541
(1989). Article III states: "The trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall
[Vol. 69:4
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In 1888, Callan v. Wilson 2 ' was the first United States Supreme
Court case to examine the constitutional limits of the right to jury trial.
The Court reversed a conspiracy conviction tried without a jury, inter-
preting the jury clauses of the Constitution in light of colonial common
law. The Court recognized a class of petty offenses the prosecutions of
which did not fall within the jury trial guarantee.2 2 Because conspiracy
was indictable at common law, it was not of this class of petty offense.
23
Therefore, the Court reasoned that prosecution of conspiracy com-
manded the right to a jury. Evaluation of the common law indictability
of the offense became the first of two common law tests employed to
distinguish petty from serious offenses.
24
Sixteen years later, the second common law test was born. In Schick
v. United States,2 5 the majority looked to the moral quality of the offense
in finding a violation of the Oleomargarine Act of 188626 petty for jury
trial purposes. 27 In making its assessment, the Court also considered
the harshness of the prescribed punishment,28 thereby presaging use of
be by Jury ...." U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. The framers originally chose the words
"trial of all criminal offenses." 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 187
(Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937). Prior to adoption of the constitution, the framers
amended the wording to read "all crimes." Id. at 434, 438, 576, 601. The United States
Supreme Court has interpreted the eighteenth century understanding of the word
"crimes" to mean serious offenses only. See, e.g., Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 69-
70 (1904). Hence, the Court has concluded that the change from "all criminal offenses" to
"all Crimes" expresses an intent to exclude petty offenses from the jury trial right. Id. at
70.
The Sixth Amendment states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .... U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
That the phrasing of this clause differs from the "all Crimes" language in Article III is
immaterial. See Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 10, at 971. The Sixth Amendment was
intended to enumerate the common law features ofjury trials guaranteed in Article III, not
to expand the class of offenses to which that guarantee applied. l-; see also Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 371 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S.
540, 549 (1888); 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONsTrruTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 662 (Boston, Hillard, Grey & Co. 1833).
A significant minority of jurists and commentators interpret the Constitution as in-
cluding all criminal prosecutions within the scope of the jury trial guarantee. See, e.g.,
Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 74-76 (1970) (Black and Douglas, JJ., concurring);
Schick, 195 U.S. at 83, 98-100 (Harlan,J., dissenting); George Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No
Peers!, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 245 passim (1959).
21. 127 U.S. 540 (1888).
22. Id. at 549, 555.
23. Id. at 555, 557.
24. But see Robert P. Connolly, Note, The Petty Offense Exception and the Right to a Jury
Trial, 48 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 205, 213-14 (1979); Kenneth C. Picton, Note,Jury Trials for
Petty Offenses: Time to Drop the Common Law Tests?, 12 STETSON L. REv. 191, 201-02 (1984).
These authors divide the common law tests into three. They distinguish the moral quality
test employed in Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904), from the malum in se test
employed in District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73 (1930). These tests (see infra
text accompanying notes 25-31) are more appropriately classed together, as malum in se
designates acts that are inherently immoral. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 959 (6th ed. 1990).
25. 195 U.S. 65 (1904).
26. Oleomargarine Act of 1886, ch. 840, § 11, 24 Stat. 209 (repealed 1950) (act taxing
oleomargarine).
27. Schick, 195 U.S. at 67. In part, the Court based its decision that the jury right
constitutionally could be waived on the pettiness of the offense. See Patton v. United
States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930) for the modem standard for jury trial waiver.
28. Schick, 195 U.S. at 67-68. The penalty was a fifty dollar fine.
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a criterion on which later decisions would rely heavily. In 1930, the
moral quality test was further developed by District of Columbia v. Colts.2 9
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Sutherland found reckless auto-
mobile driving to be a malum in se offense and an indictable offense by
common law standards. 30 These findings led the Court to conclude that
the infraction was serious enough to secure the right to jury trial. 3 '
After Colts, the Supreme Court moved away from tests that evalu-
ated the nature of criminal offenses in light of common law standards
and began judging criminal seriousness in light of current normative
standards objectively expressed by statutory penalties.3 2 In the 1937
case of District of Columbia v. Clawans,3 3 the Court took the first significant
step in this direction. Justice Stone, writing for the majority, first ap-
plied both common law tests and found that dealing in second-hand per-
sonal property without a license was not a serious crime.34 Yet the
majority, uneasy with the judicial subjectivity involved in applying the
common law tests and seeking a more objective measure of criminal se-
riousness, went on to pursue the analysis touched upon in Schick.3 5 Jus-
tice Stone looked to the legislative penalty as an objective embodiment
of social and ethical judgments attaching to the crime and found that an
authorized imprisonment of ninety days expressed a social judgment
that the crime was not serious.
36
In 1968, Duncan v. Louisiana3 7 extended the use of objective criteria
found in Clawans. The defendant was convicted of simple battery and
sentenced to sixty days' imprisonment.3 8 In assessing the seriousness of
the crime, the Court focused exclusively on the severity of the legisla-
tively authorized penalty of two years' imprisonment.3 9 To aid its evalu-
ation, the majority looked to the federal definition of petty offense40 and
to the punishment most often accompanying petty offenses at common
law.4 1 The Court, declining to establish a specific quantum of punish-
29. 282 U.S. 63 (1930).
30. Id. at 73. (When horses constituted the motive power, the offense amounted to a
public nuisance.)
31. Id. at 74.
32. That the severity of the statutory penalty expresses the crime's seriousness is sup-
ported by both retributive and utilitarian theories of punishment. Compare John Cotting-
ham, Varieties of Retribution, 29 PHIL. Q. 238, 238 (1979) (classical retributive theory of
repayment) with JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION ch. XIV (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970) (classical utilitarian theory).
33. 300 U.S. 617 (1937).
34. Id. at 625.
35. Id. at 625-28;see Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541 n.5 (1989).
36. Id. at 625-30.
37. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
38. Id. at 146; La. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:35 (West 1950) (maximum imprisonment, two
years) (current version at LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:35 (West 1986)).
39. Id. at 159-62.
40. Id. at 161 (citing 18 U.S.C. § *1 (1964)) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 19 (1988)).
This section defines the term "petty offense" as a Class B or Class C misdemeanor. 18
U.S.C. § 3559(a)(7) (1988) sets the maximum imprisonment for Class B misdemeanors at
six months or less.
41. At colonial common law, petty offenses generally carried no more than six
months' imprisonment. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 161; see District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300
766 [Vol. 69:4
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ment distinguishing serious from petty crimes, decided only that a crime
carrying a maximum authorized penalty of two years' imprisonment was
serious by common law and contemporary standards of punishment.
42
Writing for the majority, Justice White rejected the State of Louisiana's
argument43 that under Cheffv. Schnackenberg44 the proper measure of a
crime's seriousness is the penalty actually imposed The Court empha-
sized that Chefinvolved a criminal contempt statute that did not author-
ize a maximum penalty.4 5 The opinion is clear that, where it exists, the
maximum statutory penalty, not the penalty actually imposed, is the
proper objective measure of the crime's seriousness.
4 6
In the 1970 Supreme Court case Baldwin v. New York, 4 7 the plurality
reiterated that the severity of theauthorized penalty provides the proper
and most objective standard for ascertaining society's view of criminal
seriousness.48 The defendant received the maximum sentence for vio-
lating a pickpocketing statute, which authorized a one-year imprison-
ment.4 9 The plurality concluded only that a crime carrying a maximum
sentence of more than six months was serious, but did not address
whether a crime carrying a maximum sentence of six months or less was
serious.50
The most recent Supreme Court case to address the petty offense
exception was Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas. 5 1 The issue was whether
prosecution of an offense carrying a six-month sentence required jury
trial. Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court, confirmed the
Duncan-Baldwin mandate: criminal seriousness is to be ascertained by
evaluating the severity of the statutory penalty. 52 Justice Marshall ex-
plained that because the legislature is best positioned to respond to so-
ciety's ethical judgments, statutory penalties best express society's view
of criminal seriousness; therefore, jury entitlement must turn on statu-
U.S. 617, 626 nn.2-3 (1937); Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 10, at 934 & apps. A-D
(summary of colonial petty offenses).
42. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 161-62.
43. See Brief for Appellee at 7-9, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (No. 410).
44. 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
45. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 161-62 & n.35.
46. See id. However, where the legislature has not spoken as to the seriousness of a
crime by authorizing a maximum sentence, the penalty imposed substitutes as a measure
of that seriousness. See id. at 162 n.35; Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538,
542 n.6 (1989); Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 511 (1974); Frank v. United
States, 395 U.S. 147, 149 (1969); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. i94, 211 (1968).
47. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
48. Id. at 68 (citing District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 628 (1937); Frank,
395 U.S. at 148).
49. Defendant was convicted of "jostling", in violation of N.Y. PENAL LAW sec. 165.25
(McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1991). Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 67 & n.l.
50. See id. at 68-69 & n.6. Justices White, Brennan and Marshall reached this conclu-
sion. Justices Black and Douglas concurred in the result, but disagreed that the Constitu-
tion exempts petty offenses from the jury right. Id. at 74 (Black and Douglas, JJ.,
concurring).
51. 489 U.S. 538 (1989). The defendant was convicted, without a jury, of driving
under the influence of alcohol, in violation ofNEv. REv. STAT. § 484.379(1) (1990). Id. at
539.
52. Id. at 541 & n.5; see supra text accompanying notes 39-50 (discussing the Duncan-
Baldwin mandate).
1992]
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tory, not judicial, expressions of criminal seriousness. 53 Emphasizing
this point, Justice Marshall stated that, in jury entitlement determina-
tions, it is "not constitutionally determinative" that a particular defend-
ant may actually receive a sentence less than the statutory maximum.
54
The Court edged closer to establishing a lower limit for serious offenses
in holding that a crime carrying a maximum penalty of six months or
less incarceration is presumed petty for jury trial purposes and that the
presumption is rebutted only by showing that "additional statutory pen-
alties," when combined with the maximum authorized incarceration,
clearly indicate a "legislative determination" that the offense is
serious.
5 5
B. Multiple Petty Offenses in the Tenth Circuit
On four occasions since Duncan, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
has addressed an aspect of jury entitlement that the United States
Supreme Court has not faced. This issue is whether a defendant ac-
cused of multiple petty offenses resulting from one act is entitled to jury
trial when the aggregate statutory penalty exceeds the Baldwin six-month
threshold.
In 1973 United States v. Potvin56 was the first Tenth Circuit case to
address this issue. The defendants were charged with two Forest Ser-
vice violations, each carrying a maximum prison term of less than six
months, with the aggregate penalty exceeding six months. 57 Tried with-
out a jury, the defendants were sentenced to ninety days in prison and
placed on six months' probation. 5 8 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit held
that since the charged offenses arose from the same act, transaction, or
occurrence and the aggregate maximum incarceration exceeded six
months, under Baldwin the defendants were entitled to jury trial even
though their actual sentence was less than six months.5 9
In United States v. Smyer,60 the defendants were charged with eleven
counts of violating the Antiquities Act,6 1 which charges arose from their
excavation of ruins at two adjacent archaeological sites. 62 The aggre-
gate maximum statutory penalty for each defendant was 990 days' im-
prisonment, but the penalty actually imposed was eleven concurrent
ninety-day sentences.6 3 Because ajury would not have been available in
Las Cruces, New Mexico and the defendants wanted trial there, they
53. Id. at 541-42.
54. Id. at 544.
55. Id. at 543; see also infra note 133 (discussing meaning and severity of "additional
statutory penalties").
56. 481 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1973).
57. Id. at 381.
58. Id.
59. id. at 381,383.
60. 596 F.2d 939 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 843 (1979).
61. 16 U.S.C. § 433 (1988).
62. Smyer, 596 F.2d at 940.
63. Id. at 942.
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waived their right to a jury.64 On appeal, the defendants contested the
validity of their jury waivers. Although the court found the waivers
valid,65 in dictum it addressed the defendants' argument that they were
entitled to jury trial based on the aggregated authorized sentences. Di-
rectly contradicting Potvin and without referring to that case, Judge Brei-
tenstein concluded that there is no right to jury trial where the actual
sentence for multiple petty offenses is less than six months, even where
the aggregate statutory penalty exceeds six months.
6 6
The Tenth Circuit again addressed multiple petty offenses and jury
entitlement in the 1983 case Haar v. Hanrahan.67 In a New Mexico mag-
istrate court, the defendant was convicted of simple battery and criminal
damage to property and received two consecutive ninety-day
sentences. 6 8 New Mexico law provided for de novo trial in district court
upon appeal from magistrate court, but did not allow the district court
to impose a greater sentence on appeal than that imposed below. Thus
the defendant faced maximum incarceration of 180 days upon appeal.
69
At the de novo trial, the district court denied the defendant a jury.
70
The district court affirmed the conviction, and the Tenth Circuit ac-
cepted jurisdiction on the defendant's habeas corpus petition, which
reasserted his claim that he was entitled to a jury trial in the district
court. 7 1 The State argued that even though the defendant was charged
with two offenses in the district court, each carrying a potential sentence
of six months' imprisonment, ajury trial was not required since the dis-
trict court could not have imposed a sentence exceeding six months. 7
2
Judge McKay, writing the Haar opinion for a unanimous court, ac-
knowledged that Potvin guarantees jury trial where the aggregate of the
possible penalties exceeds the Baldwin six-month limit. 73 The court rec-
oguized, however, that Potvin does not reveal whether the aggregate
statutory penalties or the aggregate penalties actually facing the defend-
ant at the commencement of the trial determine the right to jury trial.
74
Because in Potvin the sentence was not limited before trial, the Potvin
64. Id.
65. Id.; see Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930) (articulating the constitu-
tional standard for jury waiver).
66. Id. Contra United States v. Potvin, 481 F.2d 380, 381, 383 (10th Cir. 1973). The
Smyer court found support in criminal contempt and right to counsel cases. See 596 F.2d at
942. However, criminal contempt cases have little precedential value where, as here, stat-
utory penalties exist. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. Also, right to counsel
cases have been sharply distinguished from right to jury trial cases. SeeJames v. Headley,
410 F.2d 325, 331-33 & n.9 (5th Cir. 1969). For further analysis of why Smyer's conclusion
regarding aggregation of penalties is dictum, see Appellant's Reply Brief at 2-3, United
States v. Bencheck, 926 F.2d 1215 (10th Cir. 1991) (No. 90-6072).
67. 708 F.2d 1547 (10th Cir. 1983).
68. The defendant violated N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-1-6(c), 30-3-4, 30-15-1 (1978).
708 F.2d at 1547-48.
69. Id. Current New Mexico law does not limit the district court to sentence imposed
by the magistrate. See State v. Sanchez, 786 P.2d 42, 45 (N.M. 1990).
70. Haar, 708 F.2d at 1548.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1551.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1552; see United States v. Potvin, 481 F.2d 380, 381-83 (10th Cir. 1973).
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court had not faced this issue. Judge McKay thus found that Potvin left
the court to choose between two measures of criminal seriousness: the
"objective" penalty provided by the aggregate statutory incarceration or
the "subjective" penalty actually facing the defendant. 75 The court
found that the objective approach would "[broaden] the concept of a
serious offense, looking beyond the particular offenses charged to the
actual criminal activity that the aggregated charges represent."' 76 Ex-
pressing its desire not to expand the serious offense concept, the Haar
court dispensed with use of objective criteria, favoring the subjective
approach.
77
III. UNITED STATES V. BENCHECK
A. Facts
On June 19, 1989, military police officers stopped defendant
Bencheck at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, for operating his motorcycle without
face protection. 78 As a result of the ensuing exchange, Bencheck was
charged with assault and battery of a police officer, malicious injury to
property, operating a motor vehicle without a valid operator's license,
failure to obey the lawful order of a police officer, and operating a mo-
torcycle without face protection.79 Each offense carried a maximum in-
carceration of six months.8 0 Consecutive sentencing was legislatively
authorized, and consolidation of offenses was not required. 8 ' Before
trial, the malicious injury to property charge was dismissed.82
On the day of the trial, over the defendant's objection, the court
announced that it would not impanel ajury, but should the defendant be
convicted, it would not impose a sentence exceeding six months.8 3
Bencheck was acquitted of operating a motor vehicle without a valid li-
cense, but was found guilty of the remaining three charges.8 4 He was
sentenced to concurrent six-month sentences on two charges, all but ten
days of which was suspended and the balance served on probation.8 5
The court imposed an additional, concurrent ten-day sentence for the
75. Haar, 708 F.2d at 1552.
76. Id. at 1553.
77. See id.
78. Bencheck, 926 F.2d at 1513.
79. The defendant violated, in order, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 649, 1760; tit. 47,
§ 6-101 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991); tit. 47 §§ 11-102, 40-105(B) (West 1988). Bencheck,
926 F.2d at 1513.
80. Id. at 1514 & n.8. All offenses were assimilated into federal law under the Assimi-
lative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 7, 13 (1988). Id. at 1513; see also United States v. Sain, 795
F.2d 888, 890 (10th Cir. 1986) ("The purpose of the Assimilative Crimes Act is to provide
a method of punishing a crime committed on [federal] government reservations in the way
and to the extent it would have been punishable if committed within the surrounding
[state] jurisdiction.").
81. See infra note 118.
82. Bencheck, 926 F.2d at 1514 & n.8. The charge was dismissed for the state's viola-
tion of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1988). Appellant's Opening Brief at 3 n.2,
926 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1991) (No. 90-6072).
83. Appellant's Opening Brief at 3-4, 925 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1991) (No. 90-6072).
84. Id at 4.
85. Id.
[Vol. 69:4
UNITED STATES v. BENCHECK
remaining charge.8 6
The issue on appeal was whether Bencheck was denied jury trial
unconstitutionally. Bencheck asserted that Potvin, in light of Supreme
Court precedent as reinforced by Blanton, guarantees a jury trial when
one act gives rise to potential aggregate statutory penalty exceeding six
months.8 7 Bencheck claimed that Blanton implicitly overruled Haar,
8 8
which held that jury entitlement in multiple petty offense cases exists
only when the penalty actually facing the defendant at the commence-
ment of trial exceeds six months.
B. Majority Opinion
Writing for the majority, Judge Brorby acknowledged that Blanton
affirmed maximum statutory penalties as the relevant criteria for deter-
mining whether an offense is petty. 89 He stated that the Tenth Circuit,
however, recognized that the penalty actually imposed is most important
to the accused.90 Judge Brorby found these positions consistent, fol-
lowed Tenth Circuit precedent, and denied jury trial. In its analysis, the
majority noted that Haar, like Baldwin,9 1 recognized six months as the
threshold quantum of incarceration which, when exceeded, classifies a
crime as serious. 92 The court noted that the Haar threshold, unlike the
Baldwin threshold, is not exceeded by the statutory penalty, but by the
penalty actually facing the defendant at the start of trial. The court char-
acterized the Haar threshold as "corollary" to the Supreme Court's ap-
proach in Baldwin.
93
Although the Haar court described its method of determining the
seriousness of a crime as "subjective," the Bencheck court disagreed, stat-
ing that because Haar's method asks whether a discrete quantum of in-
carceration exists, the approach was actually objective.9 4 In fact, the
court implied that the approach of Duncan, Baldwin, and Blanton was ob-
jective, not because it evaluated the authorized penalty, but because it
evaluated some penalty. That is, according to the majority, the Supreme
Court approach is objective because it is "penalty-oriented." 95 Thus,
the court found that Haar's approach, being also penalty-oriented, was
objective and fully consistent with Supreme Court precedent.9 6 Follow-
ing Haar, the majority held that only penalties actually facing the de-
fendant should be considered when assessing the criminal seriousness of
multiple petty offenses.9 7 Applying the Blanton presumption, the court
86. Id.
87. See id. at 5-7.
88. Bencheck, 926 F.2d at 1514.
89. Id. at 1515.
90. Id. at 1518.
91. Baldwin is discussed supra in text accompanying notes 47-50.





97. Id. at 1518, 1520.
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concluded that since the penalty threatening Bencheck did not exceed
six months' incarceration, his criminality was presumptively petty.98
The court found the presumption was not overcome and accordingly
found no jury entitlement. 99
Buttressing the holding, the majority found its penalty-oriented ap-
proach consistent with the approach taken in criminal contempt
cases.' 0 0 It noted that in Taylor v. Hayes,' 0 1 a criminal contempt convic-
tion obtained without a jury was upheld where, absent a legislatively es-
tablished penalty, a sentence of less than six months was imposed.
10 2
For further support, Judge Brorby observed that Rule 58(a)(3) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that adherence to the
rules is not required in petty offense cases where the judge stipulates
before trial that no sentence will be imposed.'0 3 The majority appar-
ently thought that determining jury entitlement by the severity of a pre-
trial sentencing stipulation was analogous to relaxing procedural rules
where no sentence is to be imposed. 10 4 The majority cited statistics il-
lustrating the impracticability of administering jury trials for all petty
offense prosecutions and juxtaposed these statistics with certain fair trial
interests promoted by the use ofjuries. 10 5 The court did not engage in
a balancing analysis, but impliedly found support for its holding in the
practical concerns of judicial efficiency suggested by the statistics. 10 6
C. Dissenting Opinion
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Ebel maintained that Blanton over-
ruled Haar.10 7 The dissent, echoing Haar, recognized that although
Potvin required aggregation of petty offense penalties for jury trial pur-
poses, it did not reveal which penalties to aggregate: statutory penalties
or those actually threatening the defendant. However, Judge Ebel read
Blanton as unequivocally mandating that statutory penalties be aggre-
gated. 10 8 The dissent concluded that since the aggregated statutory
penalties exceeded six months Bencheck was entitled to a jury.10 9 Ac-
98. Id. at 1516-17, 1519-20. In applying the presumption to the judicially stipulated
sentence, the court did not address the fact that the presumption in Blanton was applied to
the "maximum authorized period of incarceration." Compare Bencheck, 926 F.2d at 1516-
17, 1519-20 with Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543 (1989).
99. Bencheck, 926 F.2d at 1520.
100. Id. at 1519.
101. 418 U.S. 488 (1974).
102. Bencheck, 926 F.2d at 1519.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. The Court stated, "Among the concerns is the time involved in administering a
jury system. For example, 83,092 petty offenses, 56,763 of which were traffic offenses,
were disposed of by the United States Magistrates in 1987." Id. at 1515 (citingAdministra-
tive Office of the United States Courts, Annual Report of Director, Tables M-IA, M-2, at 393, 397
(1987)).
106. Bencheck, 926 F.2d at 1515. ("The practical necessity of limiting the number ofjury
trials ... is obvious.").
107. Id. at 1521 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 1522.
109. Id.
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knowledging the majority's concern with judicial administration, Judge
Ebel argued that under present law, pretrial sentencing stipulations can-
not preclude jury trials and that the majority's administrative concerns
could be addressed either by limiting the number of offenses charged or
by changing the law to prohibit offense aggregation.'110
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Facial Conflict
The United States Supreme Court, by exclusively relying on statu-
tory penalties to gauge criminal seriousness, provided specific guidance
for determining jury entitlement."' Because it rejected evaluation of
statutory penalties, the Bencheck opinion is facially at odds with this gui-
dance and is unconvincing in its attempt to show otherwise. Construing
Haar as consistent with Blanton and its predecessors was crucial to the
court's reasoning, as the court ultimately followed Haar's approach. In
trying to reconcile these cases, the Bencheck majority stated that the
Supreme Court's objectivity mandate required only that the petty-seri-
ousness inquiry be "penalty-oriented." 1 2 Since Haar's inquiry was pen-
alty-oriented, the Bencheck majority found Haar consistent with Blanton
and its predecessors."
3
The majority's rationale does not harmonize Haar with Supreme
Court precedent. Just because a method is "penalty-oriented" does not
mean that it satisfies the Supreme Court's requirement of objectivity. 114
In single offense cases, where a maximum statutory penalty exists, the
court must ascertain criminal seriousness by evaluating the severity of
the statutory penalty. 15 Although "penalty-oriented," an evaluation of
the severity of the penalty actually imposed will not suffice." l6 There-
fore, finding the Supreme-Court method penalty-oriented does not, in
itself, justify Haar's and Bencheck's particular penalty-oriented method.
The majority's attempt to justify its penalty-oriented method on the
basis of its harmony with criminal contempt precedent is similarly
flawed. Because criminal contempt statutes do not specify maximum
penalties, the Supreme Court has specifically rejected criminal contempt
cases as precedent for evaluating criminal seriousness where statutory
penalties exist.1 17 In stating that its approach exactly followed the crim-
inal contempt cases, the majority ignored the substantial difference be-
tween criminal contempt cases and the instant case: in the former, the
110. Id.
11I. See supra text accompanying notes 33-55.
112. Bencheck, 926 F.2d at 1518.
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162 n.35 (1968).
115. See Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541-42 & n.6 (1989); cases
cited supra note 46.
116. See, e.g., Blanton, 489 U.S. at 541-42 & n.6; Duncan, 391 U.S. at 161-62 & n.35.
117. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 161-62 & n.35; cf. United States v. FMC Corp., 428 F.
Supp. 615, 620 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) (criminal contempt cases involve unique principles of
legal sanction).
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legislature has not spoken on the seriousness of the criminal act, while
in the latter, the legislature has determined statutory penalties, has au-
thorized consecutive sentencing and has not required mandatory con-
solidation of offenses.' 18 The legislature thus had expressed its view
that an incident generating the multiple offenses was, in society's eyes,
more serious than an incident generating fewer of the offenses. 119 In
such a situation, the aggregate statutory penalty provides, under
Supreme Court standards, the only acceptable measure of criminal
seriousness.120
B. Substantive Conflict
The Supreme Court has established a method for objectively deter-
mining when the stakes facing criminal defendants are too high to ex-
empt prosecutions from the jury trial guarantee.' 21 The Court has had
several opportunities to allow judicially imposed penalties to measure
criminal seriousness in non-contempt cases. 122 In each instance it has
refused to do so, favoring some other measure, the modern measure
being legislative penalties. 123 The Court has reasoned that legislative
penalties best express criminal seriousness because they are the truest
measure of the consequences at stake in criminal prosecutions. 124 The
Court believes that social and moral judgments attaching to crimes
largely define their seriousness 125 and that legislatures are far better
equipped to capture community judgments than the judiciary.' 26 The
Court has thus reasoned that community judgments represented within
statutory penalties are important components of the potential conse-
quences facing criminal defendants.
If legislatures alone can reach these judgments, measuring criminal
seriousness by judicially reduced sentences underestimates the gravity
of the consequences facing the accused. Such a method might therefore
deny jury trial when, under Supreme Court standards, conviction carries
sufficiently severe potential consequences to secure the constitutional
118. See Bencheck, 926 F.2d at 1514, 1519. Also, federal sentencing guidelines,
mandatory in federal prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) (1988), are not applicable
to petty offense convictions. 28 U.S.C. § 994(w) (Supp. 1991); UNITED STATES SENTENC-
ING COMMISSION GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1BI.9 (1990). However, where the guidelines do
require offense consolidation, the charges subsumed still operate as "aggravating factors,"
thereby expressing the heightened severity of the act. See id. at § 3D 1.2 cmt. 5.
119. See United States v. O'Connor, 660 F. Supp. 955, 956 (N.D. Ga. 1987); State v.
Sanchez, 786 P.2d 42, 46 (N.M. 1990); see also Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506,
519-20 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring in part) (applying the principle to multiple crimi-
nal contempt charges).
120. O'Connor, 660 F. Supp. at 956; Sanchez, 786 P.2d at 46.
121. See Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541-42 (1988).
122. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (judicially imposed sentence of sixty
days); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937) (sentence of ninety days);
Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888) (sentence of thirty days).
123. See supra text accompanying notes 36-55.
124. See, e.g., Duncan, 391 U.S. at 160.
125. See, e.g., id. at 159-60; Blanton, 489 U.S. at 541.
126. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 541-42; seealso Cheffv. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 390-
91 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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right. Therefore measuring criminal seriousness in jury entitlement de-
terminations by legislative rather than judicial penalties is constitution-
ally significant in that legislative penalties most objectively and
accurately measure the one variable-criminal seriousness-upon which
the constitutional right turns.
Furthermore, juries are intended to provide defendants accused of
serious crimes a protection of fairness commensurate with the conse-
quences at stake.' 2 7 Thus, it is appropriate that the Supreme Court,
following common law tradition, 128 has accounted for social judgments
in determining whether the protection of ajury trial is warranted. Aside
from the length of the sentence imposed, the fact of conviction itself has
far-reaching social consequences significantly impacting the wrong-
doer's life. 129 Socialjudgments attaching to conviction of petty offenses
are manifested in a plethora of collateral statutory consequences. Re-
gardless of the penalty actually imposed, conviction of crimes authoriz-
ing sentences of six months' imprisonment can collaterally result in
removal from public office,' 30 revocation of professional licenses,' 3 1 or,
upon conviction of a later offense, enhanced punishment.13 2 Possibly
Blanton's pettiness presumption would be rebutted by proof of such
sanctions. 13
3
127. See, e.g., Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156; WILLIAM FORSY'rH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY
354 (James A. Morgan, ed., 2d ed. 1875). But see, e.g., Dale W. Broeder, The Functions of the
Jury:'Facts or Fictions?, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 386 (1954); AndrewJ. Gildea, The Right to Tial By
Jury, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1507, 1536-37 & nn.164-66 (1989);J.C. McWhorter, Abolish the
Jury, 57 Am. L. REV. 42, 45-47 (1923).
There are three often-cited equitable functions of the jury. First, the jury acts as a
buffer between the defendant on one hand, and the government or a vindictive community
on the other. STORY, supra note 20, at 653. Second, group deliberation reduces error. See
generally CHARLES W.JOINER, THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA 147 (RitaJ. Simon, ed., 1975);
Dean C. Barnlund, A Comparative Study of Individual, Majority, and GroupJudgment, 58J. AB-
NORMAL AND Soc. PSYCHOL. 55 (1959); Herbert Gurnee, A Comparison of Collective and Indi-
vidual Judgments of Facts, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 106 (1937); Janet A. Sniezek &
Rebecca A. Henry, Revision, Weighting, and Commitment in Consensus Group Judgment, 45 ORGA-
NIZATIONAL BEHAV. AND HUM. DECISION PROCESS 66, 80-83 (1990). Third, juries occasion-
ally facilitate justice by refusing to enforce harsh laws. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 188 (1968)
(Harlan and Stewart, JJ., dissenting). See HARRY KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN
JURY 494-95 (1966).
128. See Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 10, at 980-81 (at common law, moral judg-
ments and the stigma of authorized punishment were important factors injury entitlement
determinations).
129. The stigma of conviction dominates the spectrum of social consequences. See
Anthony A. Cuomo, Mens Rea and Status Criminality, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 463, 505, 512
(1967); George K. Gardner, Bailey v. Richardson and the Constitution of the United States, 33
B.U.L. REV. 176, 193 (1953) (the essence of punishment lies in the conviction itself); Jo-
seph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low Visibility Decisions in the
Administration ofJustice, 69 YALE LJ. 543 app. 1 (1960); Henry M. Hart, The Aims of Criminal
Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404-06, 436-40 (1958).
130. See, e.g., Miss. CONsT. art. VI, § 175.
131. This is particularly true of misdemeanors involving moral turpitude. See, e.g., MD.
Bus. OCC. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 16-322(24)(ii) (1989) (revocation of real estate license);
OR. REV. STAT. § 9.527(2) (1988) (attorney disbarment); S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-47-200(2)
(1986 & Supp. 1990) (revocation of physician's license).
132. See OmA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, sec. 51(A) (1983).
133. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543-45 & n.8. The Court left open the possibility that
enhanced punishment facing a repeat offender could rebut the presumption. Id. at 545
n.12. However, it is not clear whether Blanton's rebuttal standard contemplates collateral
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The mere fact of conviction has less visible consequences as well.
Individual employers often will not hire persons with criminal
records. 1 4 Several research services facilitate this practice by furnish-
ing employers with information about the criminal history of their appli-
cants. 135 Imposed sentence notwithstanding, a conviction for multiple
offenses (even if arising from one incident) will impair employment op-
portunities substantially more than a conviction for a single offense.
Also, regardless of the sentences actually imposed, a convicted person
becomes an object of moral condemnation and collective hostility.
18 6
For example, conviction of petty crimes involving moral turpitude pro-
vides fertile ground for witness impeachment.' 3 7 Multiple convictions
make an impeachment more effective by intensifying the jury's moral
condemnation of the witness.
The Supreme Court, following common law tradition, has objec-
tively accounted for social judgments when assessing jury entitle-
ment.138 It has done so by requiring courts to determine criminal
seriousness by the severity of maximum statutory penalties-those pen-
alties the Court describes as the best embodiment of social judg-
ments.1 39 In the prosecution of multiple petty offenses where the
legislature has authorized consecutive sentencing, the Bencheck method
does not accurately assess criminal seriousness under Supreme Court
standards. Because the court's assessment did not evaluate the severity
of the maximum authorized penalty, it did not account for the social
judgments attaching to conviction. The resulting underestimation of
criminal seriousness unconstitutionally deprived the defendant of jury
trial.
V. CONCLUSION
Under the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the
statutory sanctions. Nor is it clear what constitutes "serious" consequences in this arena.
The Court has decided only that a $1,000 fine and a ninety day license suspension are not
severe enough to rebut the pettiness presumption. Id. at 543-45.
134. See Goldstein, supra note 129, app. I at 590.
135. StanleyJ. Fenvessy, What Info Are Employers Entitled To, DM NEWS, Mar. 4, 1991, at
20.
136. See MANFRED S. GUTTMACHER & HENRY WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 460
(1952) (Society is aggressive toward wrongdoers.);J. Morris Clark, Civil and Criminal Penal-
ties and Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REV. 379, 406-07
(1976) (Conviction imparts moral condemnation.); cf. Johannes Andrenaes, The Moral or
Educative Influence of Criminal Law, in LAw,JUSTICE, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY 50, 51-
54 (Felice J. Levine & June L. Tapp eds., 1977) (The criminal justice system conforms
behavior through messages of social disapproval.); J.L. Mackie, Retributivism: A Test Case for
Ethical Objectivity, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 622, 629 (Joel Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds., 3d
ed. 1986) (Punishable acts are those which give rise to cooperative hostility toward the
wrongdoer.).
137. See, e.g., Meyers v. United States, 377 F.2d 412, 423 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 929 (1968); FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2).
138. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160 (1968). The Court has recog-
nized the futility of subjectively evaluating the social consequences of conviction. See Blan-
ton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543 n.8. (1989); District of Columbia v.
Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 663 (1937).
139. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 541.
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Supreme Court, dispensing with jury trial in criminal cases is justified
only where prosecution presents nominal consequences. 140 Over the
past 104 years, the Supreme Court has struggled to develop a method
for objectively determining when the consequences are minor enough to
except prosecutions from the jury trial guarantee. The Court believes
these consequences are a function of the seriousness with which society
regards specific offenses and has decided that maximum statutory penal-
ties are the most reliable index of these social judgments. Hence, the
maximum statutory penalty is the most accurate and objective measure
of criminal seriousness in jury entitlement determinations. Conse-
quently, the Court has insisted that the judiciary not second-guess the
legislative determination of criminal seriousness.
1 4 1
With this history as a backdrop, the Bencheck court was faced with
applying constitutional policy to novel circumstances. In the prosecu-
tion of multiple petty offenses where consecutive sentencing was legisla-
tively authorized, the majority chose to base jury entitlement on the
severity of a judicially stipulated sentence rather than on the maximum
penalty authorized by law. This decision departs both methodologically
and substantively from Supreme Court precedent.
Stephen C. Larson
140. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 160 (The consequences of petty offense convictions are
insufficient to outweigh efficiency benefits of bench trials.).
141. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 541; Landry v. Hoepfner, 840 F.2d 1201, 1210 (5th Cir.
1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1083 (1989).
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